

# THE POWER OF OPERATIONAL ART

A Monograph  
By  
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Infantry



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## **Abstract**

In early October 1990, President Bush asked General Colin Powell to present him with military options to liberate Kuwait. For General Powell, the President's request significantly altered his approach to the crisis in the desert. His problem had changed from one of militarily deterring and diplomatically punishing Iraqi aggression to removing the dictator's forces from Kuwait.<sup>1</sup> Although US military commanders and planners had experience deterring aggression during the Cold War, no one had planned or conducted offensive operations on this order of magnitude since the Vietnam War. They would have to orchestrate the military means in a way to liberate Kuwait. The success these designers enjoyed in Desert Storm would suggest that commanders can arrange events at the operational level effortlessly. History suggests a different premise. From Gallipoli to Korea to Vietnam, modern commanders have struggled to orchestrate their military means to achieve the national end state. For the US Army and joint community, a commander learns that operational art will produce the national end state. This monograph will explore operational art's requirements for that commander to meet in order to bring about the nation's end state.

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
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
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## **Abstract**

In early October 1990, President Bush asked General Colin Powell to present him with military options to liberate Kuwait. For General Powell, the President's request significantly altered his approach to the crisis in the desert. His problem had changed from one of militarily deterring and diplomatically punishing Iraqi aggression to removing the dictator's forces from Kuwait.<sup>1</sup> Although US military commanders and planners had experience deterring aggression during the Cold War, no one had planned or conducted offensive operations on this order of magnitude since the Vietnam War. They would have to orchestrate the military means in a way to liberate Kuwait. The success these designers enjoyed in Desert Storm would suggest that commanders can arrange events at the operational level effortlessly. History suggests a different premise. From Gallipoli to Korea to Vietnam, modern commanders have struggled to orchestrate their military means to achieve the national end state. For the US Army and joint community, a commander learns that operational art will produce the national end state. This monograph will explore operational art's requirements for that commander to meet in order to bring about the nation's end state.

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## Chapter One

### The Elusive Operational Art

*Since the publication of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 the term "operational art" has achieved buzzword type status within the Army and Joint communities. Despite growing acceptance, however, a good deal of frustration surrounds the meaning and significance of operational art. For some, it is merely tactical arrows drawn larger. For others, it is a cumbersome transplant from foreign military usage. For others still, it remains a key to recent and future victories, but one whose origins are murky and whose nature and content are difficult to define.<sup>2</sup>*

*Mr. Bruce W. Menning*

Operational art emerged as a requirement in modern warfare because the Industrial Age marked the end of the Clausewitzian concept of decisive battle. Clausewitz stated in *On War* that:

There is ... no factor in war that rivals a battle in importance; and the greatest strategic skill will be displayed in creating the right conditions for [battle], choosing the right place, time and line of advance, and making the fullest use of its results.<sup>3</sup>

A senior commander schooled with this idea sought decisive battle as the means to decisive victory. He would seek a single decisive victory to produce national objectives. His opponent attempted to order his combat power in the same way. Thus, each commander had the predominance of his nation's combat power located at the same place and time. Their search for this single great battle was the center of gravity of their operations.<sup>4</sup> By the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century, important military doctrine had infused this Clausewitzian idea into most senior commanders' minds.<sup>5</sup>



The end of this concept emerged when a single battle could no longer produce a decisive outcome.<sup>6</sup> This happened because industrialization created armies with superior firepower, command and control, and endurance. Better firepower forced commanders to disperse their armies. They could no longer tightly arrange their forces on a relatively small battlefield. Instead, commanders had to array their forces across greater distances to protect them.<sup>7</sup>

On a grand scale, the railroad, telegraph, and radio improved the ability to maneuver large armies. This meant commanders could rapidly reinforce vulnerable armies to preserve them.<sup>8</sup> They no longer risked total defeat in a single clash of arms.

Finally, industrialization improved the nation's military endurance. The nation's loss of a large battle did not mean it had to surrender. It could reproduce or hold in reserve vast military resources.<sup>9</sup> Ultimately, commanders had to develop better ways to apply their forces, material, space, and time to cause another nation to surrender its will in this new age.

Military theorists in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> Century began to wrestle with the problem of how to achieve decisive victory without being able to bring about decisive battle. Young theorists like Captain Alexander Svechin of the Russian Army typified this debate. Svechin, who had returned from the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, was disturbed that Russian battles there lacked a unifying purpose.<sup>10</sup> Svechin's anxiousness sparked a new military debate in Russia on how to adapt to this new environment.<sup>11</sup>

The standard criticism of Russian senior commanders from this war was that they had failed to create a decisive confrontation with the Japanese. In Clausewitzian terms, they had not produced the single great battle to achieve decisive victory. Svechin argued

that looking for the single great battle was exactly the wrong approach. He insisted that his senior commanders' war plans had mismanaged events by failing to unify their timing, space, resources and events into a connected campaign to achieve Russian success.<sup>12</sup>

To Svechin the issue was how a theater commander struggled with the enemy until he could no longer conduct successful military operations.<sup>13</sup> To him there was no longer a single great battle at the center of a military operation, but many battles that when properly sequenced would defeat the enemy. Svechin stated:

Combat operations are not self-contained, they are only the basic material from which an operation is formed. Only in very infrequent cases can one rely on achieving the ultimate goal of combat operations in a single battle. Normally this path to the ultimate goal is broken down into a series of operations separated by more or less lengthy pauses, which take place in different areas in a theater and differ significantly from one another due to the differences between the immediate goals of one's forces temporarily strive for...On the basis of the goal of an operation, operational art sets forth a whole series of tactical missions and a number of logistical requirements. Operational art also dictates the basic line of conduct of an operation, depending on the material available, the time which maybe allotted to the handling of certain tactical missions, the forces which may be deployed for battle on a certain front, and finally on the nature of the operation itself.<sup>14</sup>

Svechin and this debate caused commanders to think in a new way about military operations. The senior commander now had to integrate more complex questions. What resources should he and can he use to defeat the enemy? Where and when should he make his attacks in the theater with these resources to destroy the enemy?<sup>15</sup>

In 1927, Svechin published *Strategy*. In this work, he called for a higher order of thinking and planning to answer to this new order of questions.<sup>16</sup> He contended first that the political leadership must determine a strategic goal in a theater of operations.<sup>17</sup> Second, they should appoint a senior theater commander to achieve it. Finally, this commander should develop the sequence of actions to apply available resources to gain

the political aim in concert with his tactical commanders.<sup>18</sup> He called this new level of thinking between the political leadership and the tactical commander operational art.<sup>19</sup>

His contributions, in the words of Soviet military historian Jacob Kipp, “to military theory can be summarized as an explicit attack on the old strategy-tactics dichotomy and the articulation of a new and very different approach in which operational art assumed central importance.”<sup>20</sup> Svechin’s new theory and other ones like it established the foundation for operational art to emerge.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 *Doctrine for Joint Operations* and Field Manual (FM) 100-5 *Operations* extend Svechin’s idea of operational art to the present. They tell us that strategic success hinges on operational art. They define operational art as:

... the skillful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives within a theater through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates theater strategy and design into operational design which links and integrates the tactical battles and engagements that, when fought and won, achieve the strategic aim...

Operational art seeks to ensure that commanders use soldiers, materiel, and time effectively to achieve strategic aims through campaign design.<sup>21</sup>

Embedded in this definition and described in JP 3-0 are the National Command Authority’s (NCA) responsibilities to provide strategic guidance and the means to achieve it.<sup>22</sup>

The problem facing modern theater commanders is achieving operational art. FM 100-5 and JP 3-0 tell us that operational art has four essential requirements:

Operational art requires **broad vision**, the ability to **anticipate**, a careful understanding of the **relationship of means to ends**, an understanding of the inherent risks that are under them, and **effective joint and combined cooperation**.<sup>23</sup>

Broad vision has two components. It is an expression of the operational commander’s ability to design a sequence in his campaign that accomplishes the strategic goal. As JP 3-0 describes, he should understand “what military conditions must be

produced in the operational area to produce the strategic goal . . . [and] what sequence of actions is most likely to produce that [goal].”<sup>24</sup>

Relating means to ends is the operational commander’s ability to use his forces to achieve the NCA’s end state. As JP 3-0 lays out, the commander must apply his resources through his vision to accomplish the strategic aim.<sup>25</sup>

Joint and combined cooperation is this commander’s capacity to integrate all of his available resources to accomplish national goals. JP 3-0 tells us that operational commanders must “seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible.”<sup>26</sup>

Anticipation, as described in FM 100-5, is the commander’s “ability to avoid surprise as operations unfold; mental and physical adjustments as a result of monitoring operations and determining future actions.”<sup>27</sup> JP 3-0 expands this definition to include the commander’s ability to exploit any advantage the enemy gives him.<sup>28</sup>

This paper will show that if a commander meets these requirements he should execute a campaign that accomplishes the national ends. If a commander meets only some or none of these requirements, he likely will execute an ineffective campaign that does not achieve the political goal. FM 100-5 and JP 3-0 warn that:

Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war [will] be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.<sup>29</sup>

This monograph will analyze the following campaigns to show how meeting these requirements for operational art led to success and failing to meet them led to collapse:

1. Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign 1915
2. The Soviet Defense 1941-43
3. The Korean War 1950-1951

First, the paper will examine the events that shaped the strategic goals of these campaigns. Second, it will describe the commander's campaign and its execution. Third, it will show whether or not these commanders accomplished their national end state. Fourth, it will show the degree to which these commanders met the requirements for operational art. Finally, the paper will conclude that successful campaigning requires commanders to meet all of operational art's requirements; meeting some or none of the requirements is a recipe for failure.

## Chapter Two

### No Operational Art Requirements Met

*Much of the success of the joint force hinges on the Joint Force Commander's capability to integrate the capabilities of the joint team and synchronize their full dimensional efforts. When Joint Force Commanders fully understand the capabilities of subordinate forces and the strategic and operational environment in which they conduct operations, and organize joint forces for flexible and responsive combat, powerful operational leverage can be achieved in all dimensions of combat operation.<sup>30</sup>*

*General (Retired) Colin L. Powell*

In late 1914, the British War Council was seeking an answer to the stalemate along the Western Front. The impasse between the Allies and the Central Powers had ended the War Council's hope for a short war. Consequently, the Council eyed operations in the Dardanelles to take pressure off its forces on the Western Front and weaken the Central Powers alliance.

Turkish control of the Dardanelles not only threatened freedom of movement in the Mediterranean, but also held the vital entrance to a strategic sea lane to Russia. Since these straits led to Constantinople and it controlled the sea lane between the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, the British Navy could not support Russia through this line of communication. Additionally, British control of the Dardanelles and Constantinople would threaten the stability of the Turkish government, a key member of the Central Powers. Controlling the Dardanelles was the War Council's first step to cause Turkey's withdrawal, weaken their enemy's alliance, and aid Russia. As J.F.C. Fuller wrote in his

book *A Military History of the Western World*, had the operation prevailed it would have caused:

... the relief of Russia, the neutrality or active cooperation of the Balkan states; the salvation of Serbia, the defeat of Turkey, and the encirclement of Germany from the east while she was gripped in the West. In all probability, not only could Russia have held her own but ... without Gallipoli the Russians would have had no revolution.<sup>31</sup>

On January 28, 1915, the War Council approved a naval attack on the Dardanelles designed to seize this strategic sea lane. The Council did not approve the use of Army forces for this operation.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, on February 19 and 25, the British Navy conducted its first operation with a landing force of roughly two hundred marines. They experienced some initial success, but could not retain the key terrain they had won. With no significant opposition on land, Turkish defenders forced the Navy's withdrawal from the straits.<sup>33</sup> Receiving word of this failure, the War Council approved the use of Army forces to support naval operations in the Dardanelles on February 25.<sup>34</sup> But Army forces would not arrive for two months.

On March 5, the Turks repelled a second naval attack through the straits.<sup>35</sup> Since the ground forces were in Egypt, the Navy had again attacked without an adequate landing force.

This second attack signaled to the Turkish and German governments the value of the straits to the British. On March 26, the Turks, with German advice and consent, appointed German General Liman von Sanders commander of the Dardanelles defense. He had 25,000 Turkish troops.<sup>36</sup> By April 25, his force had grown to 60,000 defenders, six Turkish divisions.<sup>37</sup>

Sanders' most significant contribution to the defense was not the increased number of troops. The German General radically changed how the Turks would defend the


peninsula. Instead of a forward deployed defense, he constructed an active defense. With his six divisions, he built three strong points, one at Bulair with three divisions, one at Cape Helles with one division, and one at Troy on the Asiatic coast with two divisions. He located each strong point away from the coast. Considering where the Allies landed, he would order their attack from the strong point to the landing site to force the them back into the sea.<sup>38</sup>

On March 12, the War Council appointed General Hamilton commander of military forces deployed to seize the straits.<sup>39</sup> The Council ordered him to conduct operations in the Dardanelles as quickly as possible.<sup>40</sup> His command initially consisted of 40,000 Allied soldiers in Egypt. Reacting to the failed naval attacks, the War Council gave him an additional infantry division originally dedicated to the Western Front.

Consequently, on March 16, the 29<sup>th</sup> British Infantry Division quickly deployed to Egypt to link up with French, Australian, and New Zealand divisions in the country and his total strength grew to 75, 000 troops.<sup>41</sup> On 17 March, Hamilton, in England, discovered that the Navy had not properly configured his ships for a landing operation as they left port from England with the rapidly added division. Consequently, the growth in strength was offset by the delay caused by adding this British division. It would take the Navy three weeks to reconfigure the ships for an amphibious operation.<sup>42</sup>

Yet, this naval mishap did not deter Hamilton. On March 22, he gathered his commanders and staff to discuss the operation on the Queen Elizabeth still at port in England.<sup>43</sup> He determined that the previous naval operations had eliminated the opportunity to land and attack through the straits. Furthermore, he had gained intelligence that the Turks were entrenched at Bulair.





**Figure 1 The Gallipoli Peninsula**

Bulair was located at the northern and most narrow portion of the peninsula. He preferred to attack there since it was the shortest approach from the western side to the eastern side's fortresses protecting the straits.<sup>44</sup>

Consequently, he decided that in his main effort the 29<sup>th</sup> Division would land at Cape Helles on the southern tip of Gallipoli in order to destroy the light forces there and rapidly defeat the fortifications on the eastern side of the peninsula. A supporting effort, consisting of Australian and New Zealand

forces, would land on the western side of Gallipoli at Gaba Tepe, and march six miles inland to block any effort by the Turks to oppose the landings at Cape Helles.

Additionally, he would land a sizable French force on the western shore of Turkey at Kum Kale. Finally, he would conduct a naval bombardment with troop transports in their visible presence from the Gulf of Saros in vicinity of Bulair. He designed these two attacks to confuse the enemy as to his actual landing sites. The French deception force would then return to support the main effort at Cape Helles.<sup>45</sup> Despite having an intricate plan, it was designed exclusively to get ashore.<sup>46</sup>

On April 25, Hamilton attacked the Turkish forces on Gallipoli (Figure 1).<sup>47</sup> From Sanders' perspective the attack began at 5 a.m. with initial reports of a British naval attack

at Kum Kale. Next he received word that the British Navy was bombarding his defenses at Bulair. Almost immediately after this news he had received reports that a large French force had landed at Kum Kale. By mid morning he had word that there were landings at Cape Helles and Gaba Tepe.

Hamilton, for the moment, had successfully deceived Sanders into thinking that his main effort was at Bulair. Sanders took steps to protect this vital stretch of land. He moved from Gallipoli to Bulair. By the evening, he was convinced that nothing was happening at Bulair and that the main attack had to be in the south. He ordered two of the divisions there south towards Cape Helles and Gaba Tepe.<sup>48</sup>

From Hamilton's perspective, his attack began with the landing operation at Gaba Tepe at 4 a.m. The Australian and New Zealand soldiers, due to the confusion of night operations and minimal rocket fire from the shore, debarked their landing craft one mile north of Gaba Tepe at Anzac Cove. Despite this misadventure and no naval gunfire, the landing caught the Turks completely by surprise.

However, because the Allied force was equally confused by their landing, they had failed to exploit the advantage offered to them by having surprised the enemy. The Allied force allowed the Turks to seize the key terrain guarding Anzac Cove and by midnight, Hamilton ordered them to dig in to preserve the landing site.<sup>49</sup> When they did so, the landing's earlier success unraveled. 15,000 Allied soldiers would fight for three months on the beaches below the high ground only to take 5,000 casualties.<sup>50</sup>

At 5 a.m. the British Navy began the attack at Cape Helles with a large naval bombardment at the landing sites. The Turks did not return fire. Due to the difficulty the landing craft had against the current at the mouth of the Dardanelles, the barrage had

ended and the sun had risen before the force made it to shore. There was no element of surprise in this landing and the naval artillery had little effect on the defense.<sup>51</sup>

The Turks opposed three of the four landing efforts at Cape Helles with less than a brigade of infantry and a company engineers. But, unlike Anzac Cove, they already were entrenched in defenses on the key terrain. The high ground, machine guns, and Turkish resolve confronted the 29<sup>th</sup> Division landings until reinforcements from Bulair arrived at the end of day. Yet at the one beach where events went according to plan, elements from two British regiments stayed on the beaches for eleven hours without advancing to the key terrain above them.<sup>52</sup>

Adding to the confusion at Cape Helles was the Navy's inability to land troops at the planned beaches.<sup>53</sup> In addition, because the combat was so close and communication with the ground forces they could easily see so poor, the Navy was unable to provide artillery support during the attack.<sup>54</sup> Consequently, what started as an unopposed naval bombardment ended in general confusion at the beaches on Cape Helles. Like their allies to the north, the British would fight from these initial positions from below key terrain for three months.

The early morning deception attacks at Kum Kale and Bulair went well. The French captured its fortifications. Then, according to Hamilton's plan they returned to their ships to support the main effort at Cape Helles.<sup>55</sup> The British Navy's feint from the Bay of Saros had temporarily deceived Sanders. He stayed at Bulair until night fall.

At the end of the day, Hamilton had one successful attack at Kum Kale and two beachheads on Gallipoli. Yet, he did not have control of the straits and was on the defensive at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove.<sup>56</sup> From April 26 to August 5, these entrenched

forces would repeatedly conduct disastrous frontal attacks against the Turkish trenches; no attempt was made to outflank or bypass Turkish defenses for more than three months.<sup>57</sup>

On June 2, Hamilton notified the War Council it had three courses of action; withdraw, send large reinforcements for another operation, or do nothing. Still excited by the General's initial landing success, the War Council sent Hamilton reinforcements.<sup>58</sup>

By mid July, the Turkish government committed a total of sixteen divisions to Sanders' active defense, roughly 160, 000 troops. He positioned three divisions at Anzac Cove, five at Cape Helles, three at Kum Kale, three still at Bulair, and two still at Troy.<sup>59</sup> Sanders' had 121, 000 troops defending Gallipoli and a relatively light force protecting the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. These infantry forces were equipped with only rifles, machine guns, and shovels. Sanders' did not have a fleet or the quantity or quality of artillery like Hamilton to support his defense.<sup>60</sup>

By mid July, the War Council had reinforced Hamilton's forces to roughly the equivalent of Sanders'.<sup>61</sup> Hamilton had 160, 000 troops to overcome Sanders' defense on Gallipoli. After the initial attack, Hamilton's forces were enhanced with significant amounts of artillery and mortar tubes to support offensive and defensive operations. Their effectiveness against these entrenched defenses were the same as on the Western Front.<sup>62</sup>

Furthermore, the Navy's increased combat power in the region should have enhanced Hamilton's force ratio. Yet, the Army did not trust the Navy's ability to provide naval bombardment.<sup>63</sup> Consequently, the ships' presence did not significantly magnify Hamilton's force ratio on the ground.

On the morning of August 6, General Hamilton finally attempted another amphibious operation (Figure 1, p. 13). General Frederick Stopford, Hamilton's corps commander for the operation, landed 20,000 newly arrived soldiers at Suvla Bay. His object was to establish a base of operations to make future eastward attacks from the dominating terrain above the Dardanelles narrows. Stopford knew that the Turks, with roughly 2,000 troops, defended the bay.<sup>64</sup>

Oddly enough, Stopford was not the main effort in this attack. Hamilton's main effort was his battle weary Australian and New Zealand force at Anzac Cove. This force would attack out of their trenches into the early morning darkness just prior to Stopford's landing. Their object was the same terrain it had been fighting on for three months. The key terrain that dominated the cove, Sari Bair. This attack, though bravely fought, was so unsuccessful, that Sanders thought Hamilton's main effort must be at Suvla Bay.<sup>65</sup>

Although he was confused, Sanders was fortunate he thought that Suvla Bay was the main effort. When he arrived on the scene the situation was desperate. Under his direct command and from key terrain, his Turkish troops held on despite being outgunned and severely out manned.<sup>66</sup>

In contrast, Hamilton, although acutely aware of the situation in Suvla Bay, let General Stopford fight the battle. Hamilton's concentration was on the attack at Sari Bair. Stopford, who sat on his ship, thrilled by the landing's success did not aggressively pursue the enemy before its reinforcements could arrive. He was convinced he could overcome the enemy with deliberate movement supported by artillery fire, as he had witnessed on the Western Front. He refused naval gunfire support because he did not trust it to provide safe fires.<sup>67</sup>

By August 8, Sanders was able to position more than a division to react to Stopford's cautious landing. In three days, Stopford committed his entire corps to the attack. But he could not overcome Sanders' leadership or reinforcements. Sanders' forced Hamilton once again to defend his limited success at the Suvla Bay shoreline without the ability to use it as base of operations for a future attack.<sup>68</sup> There would be no future operations to cross the peninsula from the western side.

On October 14, the War Council ordered Hamilton back to England.<sup>69</sup> They sent General Charles Munro to command Gallipoli's force. On assessing the situation, he recommended that the Allied force retreat from the peninsula.<sup>70</sup> On November 27, Munro began the evacuation.

Let us now analyze General Hamilton's failure to meet any of operational art's requirements.

First, as an operational commander, General Hamilton failed the broad vision test. Although he had an operational end state he could clearly see, ships passing through the Dardanelles toward Constantinople, he did not have a design to accomplish it.

Although Hamilton attacked from a different direction, his plan was essentially a repeat of the Navy's. He highlighted in his mind the strategic value of the straits and developed events to seize the fortifications from the southern and western side of Gallipoli. But his frontal attacks for three months from his defensive positions and his landing at Suvla Bay reinforce the notion that Hamilton's design was centered only on Gallipoli's fortifications.

Despite having a significantly larger joint and combined force than his naval counterparts and plus a flow of reinforcements, he did not rethink his design to deal with

what essentially was a new problem. Turkish forces had turned the heights into a fortified position backed by a powerful mobile reserve. Given the Navy's experiences, combined with his own for three months on the peninsula, Hamilton should have developed an entirely different design to weaken the Turkish presence around the Dardanelles.

Instead of feinting with a landing on the Turkish coast, suppose Hamilton kept the French on Kum Kale until the Turks had to divert assets away from the peninsula. If he had waited patiently on Gallipoli while the Turks dealt with 18, 000 Frenchmen at Kum Kale, he could have upset the integrity of Sanders' defense. His landing at Suvla Bay or at another site would have a much greater chance of succeeding. Yet Hamilton conducted frontal attacks for three months before mounting another amphibious operation, while the success at Kum Kale went unexploited.

He consistently remained fixed on Gallipoli's fortifications to achieve his operational end state. As the authors in *Military Misfortunes* wrote:

Over the next three months the Allied troops struggled to enlarge their foothold against the opposition of Turkish machine guns and the difficulties of the terrain, while their commander telegraphed home for more divisions and more artillery ammunition. Men were easier to find than shells, and with them Hamilton planned to make a major effort at the start of August to surge to the crests of the hills which dominated the Gallipoli peninsula. Once held, they would put the Allies in a commanding position from which to bombard the Turkish positions, support the navy against Turkish batteries strung out along the narrows, clear the peninsula. All that would remain would be a triumphant advance on Constantinople, already terrorized by the appearance of Allied battleships off the Golden Horn.<sup>71</sup>

Simply developing another plan to land forces on the weaker side of Gallipoli was not a genuine change to the events required to overcome the Turkish control of the straits.

Although Hamilton had a good operational end state to base his future upon, he did not, despite his new resources, design a different series of events to accomplish it.

General Hamilton did not correctly relate his means to accomplishing his operational end state. First, he insisted on trying to defeat a static and forward deployed defense. From the campaign's outset, Hamilton's preoccupation was to get ashore. He demonstrated to some extent his ability to land forces. Once ashore however, he convinced himself that he could overcome the forces to his front to get to the eastern side of Gallipoli. His useless attacks for three months clearly illustrate this point. Even the landing at Suvla Bay was designed to support operations to push the Turks off the key terrain at Sari Bair. Hamilton should have realized that his means were playing into Sanders' ends.

Hamilton never developed a method to overcome an active defense. Despite having the British Navy and two successful deception operations as a big part of his means, he never thought of a method to weaken or disrupt the active defense. Clearly, Sanders was surprised at Suvla Bay and had to react quickly to save the defense. Yet Hamilton let Stopford run the supporting attack, while he witnessed another failed effort at Anzac Cove. An opportunity was lost because Hamilton did not realize what he had done to Sanders' active defense. In other words, he never deliberately used his forces (means) in a new way to achieve his operational end.

Finally, Hamilton, despite having three full corps by mid-July and the most modern navy in the world at his disposal, was fixed at the tactical level. He could not think of an operational method to achieve an operational end. He relied on wasteful tactical frontal attacks for three months to achieve this operational end objective.

General Hamilton failed to integrate his joint and combined combat power to achieve his operational end. First, Hamilton did not integrate all of the forces available to



him to achieve his objectives. Sanders' weakness was on the Asiatic coast. Hamilton chose not to exploit the opportunity he created at Kum Kale. The French return to Cape Helles after their successful attack at Kum Kale shows that Hamilton was only ready for a success on Gallipoli.

Second, as noted earlier, Hamilton conducted wasteful frontal attacks for three months from his initial landing sites before attempting to use the sea to maneuver. Given the success of the deceptions at Bulair and Kum Kale, Hamilton should have tried other efforts to confuse Sanders. Hamilton had unrestricted use of the sea throughout much of his theater, but failed to use it to his advantage.

Finally, despite having ship to shore communication with line of sight and radio, Hamilton and the Navy never worked out their problems with naval gunfire. Since much of the combat was close quarters, Army officers like Stopford did not trust it. Yet, given its potential effects and three months to train with it in combat, one would expect they could have worked out this problem. This issue gains even greater significance given the ground artillery ammunition shortage.

Overall, Hamilton's command paid too little attention to how they could coordinate their available combat power to capture the straits and seize this vital sea lane. Failing to exploit his success at Kum Kale, his freedom of the seas, and the potential effects of accurate naval gunfire significantly contributed to this operational failure.

Finally, Hamilton did not anticipate the effects of Sanders' defense or his own offense. General Sanders was assigned to provide the professional military leadership the Turkish government felt it needed to protect the straits. The German General did not disappoint them. As mentioned, he significantly strengthened the defenses of the straits

with manpower and material. In addition, he reorganized the forward deployed defense into an active one that could respond to a variety of landing efforts to seize the fortifications on Gallipoli.<sup>72</sup>

Except for minor feints to facilitate landings, Hamilton never made the mental or physical adjustments needed to overcome the effects of an active defensive strategy. He continued to confront it at its teeth: Anzac Cove and Cape Helles. When he finally attempted to maneuver around it, it was not even his main effort. He did not compel an aggressive commander to take advantage of the successful maneuver at Suvla Bay.

Furthermore, on April 25, Hamilton had one successful landing in his operation. The French seized the forts at Kum Kale and then returned to the ships. Sanders would eventually reinforce Kum Kale with three divisions because Hamilton did not exploit this early opportunity to threaten the entrance to the Dardanelles.<sup>73</sup>

Hamilton did develop a plan to deceive and surprise the commander of the Turkish defenses. Yet, he did not make the physical and mental adjustments to take advantage of the effects of this surprise.

Although the War Council shaped an affective end state, General Hamilton's campaign failed to meet any of operational art's requirements for the following reasons. First, his operational design was fixed solely on destroying the fortifications on Gallipoli. Second, he never adjusted his methods to relate his means to achieve operational objectives, even though the conditions of the campaign changed dramatically. Third, his failure to effectively employ his joint combat power from the sea or exploit his combined success at Kum Kale culminated this disaster. Finally, Hamilton failed to anticipate the nature of the defense he was attacking on the peninsula or his own success off it.

In this first case study, Hamilton's campaign did not meet any of operational art's requirements and the national end state was not achieved. No amount of tactical success could overcome operational failure. Chapter Three will show how meeting all of the requirements achieves favorable results.

## Chapter Three

### All Operational Art Requirements Met

*The first duty of the art of politics with respect to strategy is to formulate the political goal of the war. Any goal should be strictly coordinated with the resources available to achieve it. The political goal should be appropriate to one's war waging capability.*<sup>74</sup>

*General-Major A.A. Svechin*

On August 23, 1939, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The two leaders agreed not to fight each other and in the future divide Poland and the Baltic states.<sup>75</sup> On September 1, Germany invaded and conquered Poland using their Blitzkrieg tactics.

On December 18, 1940, Hitler published Directive 21. The directive's military purpose was to protect the German eastern flank from potential ground and air operations. His ultimate objective was to defeat the Soviet defense force stationed in the east with a Blitzkrieg attack and force Stalin to surrender.<sup>76</sup>


In late December, Soviet intelligence collected credible information that Hitler would invade the Soviet Union in spite of his pact with Stalin. Stalin's disbelief in this intelligence did not stop him from assembling his generals for a wargame on December 30.<sup>77</sup> Principal players at this game were General Georgii Zhukov, an offensive and combined arms expert, and General D.C. Pavlov, an armor expert. Zhukov played the German aggressor, while Pavlov played the defender.<sup>78</sup>

During the initial wargame Pavlov chose, at Stalin's direction, to defend the newly expanded Soviet frontier forward with his combat power. Zhukov crushed through Pavlov's defense. His method used three axes of attack, with his main attack directed at Moscow. Stalin stopped the game before Zhukov's main effort reached Moscow.<sup>79</sup>

Stalin ordered a second game. The two principal players switched roles. Stalin this time allowed Zhukov to arrange his defense in depth. There are no published reports of the results of the second game, but Stalin did abandon the forward defense option for two reasons. First, he realized that he did not have an army equipped to defeat a rapid German thrust from the east. Second, he concluded that defending forward did not take advantage of Soviet terrain. The wargame produced one other result. Stalin named General Zhukov Chief of the Soviet General Staff.<sup>80</sup>

Stalin would hold Zhukov responsible for planning the ways to absorb and defeat a Blitzkrieg blow to the Soviet Army in order to preserve his communist state.<sup>81</sup> The strategic end state Stalin relayed to his operational planner was to simply avoid the fate suffered by the French and Polish Armies. Zhukov must preserve the integrity of both the Soviet force and defense.

From December 1940 to June 1941, Zhukov developed and revised his defensive campaign plan. He knew ultimately his operational end state was to defeat the German main attack on Moscow. This would be his main effort in spite of objections from Stalin and other members of the High Command. They insisted that the Ukraine should be the main effort because of its rich oil reserves.<sup>82</sup> Combining the offensive theories of Triandafilov, (deep operations and combined arms attacks) and the defensive theories of



**Figure 2: Zhukov's Defense 22 June 1941**

Tukhachevski, (tactical, operational, and strategic zones of defense) Zhukov constructed his defense with his operational end state in mind.<sup>83</sup>

To accomplish this, he would develop a defense made of three essential elements. First, he would ask Stalin to conduct a rapid mobilization of Soviet forces and organize a strategic reserve. This element included moving well trained and equipped armored forces away from the expected German penetration and air attack.<sup>84</sup>

Second, he organized the command of the defense into three echelons (Figure 2).<sup>85</sup> Zhukov arrayed a 1st echelon defense in zones to counter the initial German penetrations of the Soviet western frontier. The defense would stretch north to south 1,200 miles. Its depth would cover most of European Russia. The essential purposes of these 1<sup>st</sup> echelon forces were to absorb the German attacks, to weaken their effect using the expanse and potentially brutal weather of the Soviet frontier, and to deceive the Wehrmacht into thinking they were fighting the entire Soviet Army.<sup>86</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> echelon would set the conditions for the 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon defense. Zhukov positioned this command deep enough to avoid the effects of the German advance toward Moscow, but close enough to attack its remaining strength.<sup>87</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon

would set the conditions for the 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon defense, the strategic reserve. With the German advance in the defense, weakened and extended, this 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon would counterattack to defeat the main effort and conduct a counter offensive.<sup>88</sup>

The final element of the plan was to would protect and preserve the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> echelons for future counter attack and offensive operations.<sup>89</sup> This element was more than just mobilizing forces. In Zhukov's mind, he had to reposition his strongest forces and most modern material to preserve the main effort's defense at Moscow. Consequently, the 1<sup>st</sup> echelon would have to fight an ill equipped, undermanned defense.

In February, Stalin partially mobilized the Soviet Armed Forces according to Zhukov's plan.<sup>90</sup> He allowed Zhukov to reposition his strongest forces as the 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon and to move critical military assets out of danger to help constitute part of the 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon, but he did not allow him to conduct a full mobilization of it. Stalin was concerned that mobilizing the strategic reserve would provoke Hitler to attack. In May, with the German invasion imminent and at Zhukov's behest, Stalin ordered the full mobilization of the 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon.<sup>91</sup>

On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa. One hundred and twenty-one divisions attacked along three major axes. Northern Army Group attacked north to Leningrad. Center Army Group attacked due east to Moscow, and as Zhukov had anticipated, was Hitler's main effort. Southern Army Group attacked south to Stalingrad.<sup>92</sup>

By mid-July, Hitler's forces crashed through much of the Soviet 1<sup>st</sup> echelon defense. This echelon surrendered 400 miles of territory, more than 300,000 soldiers, 1000 tanks, 600 artillery pieces, and 2,000 aircraft. Northern Group penetrated the

Leningrad province. Center Group seized Minsk and Smolensk and was 200 miles from Moscow. A stiffer Soviet defense, terrain and weather slowed Southern Group's advance.<sup>93</sup>

Like the forces in Poland or France, the Blitzkrieg attack badly damaged the Soviet military. Yet, it had not paralyzed Zhukov's 1<sup>st</sup> echelon defense. In fact, Hitler decided to weaken Center Group's force despite objections from the Wehrmacht and reinforce Southern Group's slow advance. Despite this confusion in the German command, the 1<sup>st</sup> echelon fight was expensive for the Soviets and Zhukov.<sup>94</sup>

By early August, Stalin, distressed with Blitzkrieg's tactical effects and of Zhukov's management of the operational fight, demoted him to command a 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon Army Front responsible for blocking Center Group's attack. Zhukov would later get to demonstrate his tactical and operational skill as part of his overall campaign plan.

Zhukov's defensive plan was turned over to the capable hands of General Shaposhnikov, Stalin's new Chief of the General Staff.<sup>95</sup> For the remainder of the war, although Zhukov would be in the field, the essential elements of his operational plan, the echeloned defense and the strategic reserve, remained in tact. Furthermore, he was now at the heart of his plan, defending the line of attack to Moscow.<sup>96</sup>

By the fall of 1941, Southern Group seized Kiev. German forces produced one million Soviet casualties and won many battles. Zhukov's defensive plan was stressed, but still in tact.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, the 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon and part of the 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon was in position near Moscow and Zhukov was part of it.

On the other hand, Hitler and his generals still did not agree on where to focus the operation; in the center or the south? Hitler initially thought he should continue to exploit



Southern Group's success at Kiev, but the Wehrmacht convinced him, fortunately for the Soviets, to return Center Group as the operation's main effort. Center Group prepared to seize Moscow.<sup>98</sup>

In late November and early December, Center Group reached the outskirts of Moscow. On December 6, 1941, Shaposhikov launched his 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon which included Zhukov's Army Reserve Front. Zhukov's destructive counterattack surprised the Germans and forced Center Group to withdraw 60 miles west of Moscow. The Wehrmacht was now defending in the frozen terrain of western Russian. They were without winterized equipment and clothing and extended from their base of operations. Zhukov and his plan had halted Operation Barbarossa's advance.<sup>99</sup>

In 1942, with his attack now stalled in the center, Hitler ordered a major operation in the south to seize the oil fields in the Caucasus. By August, Southern Army Group, which was now divided into two groups, A and B, had forces from Group B moving toward Stalingrad and Group A moving to the Caucasus. In October, Group B seized the southern portion of Stalingrad. Group A was trying to maintain a 500 mile line of communication in the Caucasus.<sup>100</sup>

Zhukov, after his success at Moscow, was now an operational commander. He commanded the Soviet counteroffensive operation in southern Russia.<sup>101</sup> His active and echeloned defensive scheme was causing problems for the Germans throughout Russia, but in particular where he was in command of it.

From November 1942 to March 1943, he directed aggressive encirclements with four Soviet Army Fronts against the defending Group B.<sup>102</sup> On February 2, 1943, Group

B's force in Stalingrad surrendered. Under Zhukov's leadership, German forces suffered their first major defeat in the campaign.<sup>103</sup>

In the spring of 1943, Zhukov became cautious. After his success at Stalingrad, he let a good portion of Group B's defeated force, under the determined leadership of General Manstein, breakout from his encirclement and reconstitute a coherent line of defense to rearm and refit.<sup>104</sup> Zhukov placed his army in strong pointed defenses in depth to protect his success, conserve his strength, and wait for reinforcements from the strategic reserve to resume the offensive.<sup>105</sup>

The Germans on the other hand were convinced that the Russian's had culminated. Consequently, Hitler and General Manstein, commander of the remainder of Southern Group's original force, developed a plan a to regain the initiative in the south and in the center. Hitler called the plan Operation Citadel. Manstein's objectives were limited. They were to penetrate the Soviet defense, capture valuable equipment, and reunite encircled forces.<sup>106</sup> Hitler wanted the plan to force Stalin to either surrender or sue for peace.<sup>107</sup> Manstein was not that optimistic.

Southern and Center Groups', whose defenses connected in the vicinity of Kursk, would join forces to create a breakthrough at this critical line of communication. Hitler delayed Manstein's late spring attack until July.<sup>108</sup>

Operation Citadel failed for numerous reasons. At the heart of this defeat was Zhukov's ability to use joint combat power in his strong pointed defense.<sup>109</sup> This strong point defense integrated anti-tank and air systems, close air support, and a mobile tank reserve to counter any penetrations of it. At Kursk, the Soviet Air Force that had been destroyed fighting Zhukov's 1<sup>st</sup> tactical echelon battles and the Luftwaffe in June 1941,

reemerged with a highly effective close air support plane, the MIG-3.<sup>110</sup> During this fight the Wehrmacht lost three fifths of its armored force and the Luftwaffe lost nineteen percent of its aircraft.<sup>111</sup> At its end, neither Army Groups Center nor Southern had gained any Soviet territory.<sup>112</sup>

During Operation Citadel, the Soviets also launched under, Zhukov's command, the remainder of the 3<sup>rd</sup> strategic echelon to defeat the German attack at Kursk and resume the counteroffensive.<sup>113</sup> Although the German Army defended their occupied territory, they did not have the strength to absorb the combat power of these 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon forces.<sup>114</sup> By January of 1944, the Soviet Army had broken the siege at Leningrad and switched to the offensive. Now in command of Soviet Army and Air Force resources, Zhukov systematically began to attrit the German Army in Russia.<sup>115</sup> By July 1944, Soviet forces had returned to Poland and the German Army was in retreat.<sup>116</sup>

These are the results of Zhukov's defensive plan. First, the German Armed Forces never forced the Soviets to surrender in spite of enormous tactical success. Second, Soviet forces were in position to counterattack at Moscow. Third, Zhukov had accurately assessed the effects of Soviet weather and terrain on German Blitzkrieg and their scheme of maneuver during Operation Barbarossa. Finally, Zhukov's strategic reserve was the critical piece required to halt then defeat German offensive operations in the Soviet Union.

Let us now analyze General Zhukov's ability to meet all of operational art's requirements.

General Zhukov passes the broad vision test. As Bryan Fugate stated in his book *Operation Barbarossa* before the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, "... [that] the Soviet state exists today is testament to the correctness of his vision, ..."<sup>117</sup>

Zhukov's broad vision designed a defense that absorbed the effects of a Blitzkrieg force aimed at his operational end, Moscow and preserved the USSR, his strategic objective. His vision saw both the letters "D" for design and "E " for end state.

First, he designed the events to use forces in the present and preserve others for the future. His 1<sup>st</sup> tactical echelon was able to absorb the effects of the brutal German advance, while the 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon was preserved for the counterattack at Moscow. By preserving his 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon and sacrificing his 1<sup>st</sup>, the Soviets were able to employ their best equipped armored divisions, as designed, at Moscow.

Second, he designed events so that the 1<sup>st</sup> tactical echelon's terrain and depth weakened the German's long advance through its main approach. Four months into their attack, not only were the Wehrmacht and Hitler indecisive in the south and center, but when their main effort finally made it to Moscow it was vulnerable. Zhukov's tactical counterattack and the 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon's one compelled Center Group to withdraw 60 miles and the Wehrmacht to temporarily hunker down into a frozen defense. Operation Barbarossa's offensive push to Moscow was over.

Zhukov effectively related Soviet available means using methods that preserved the continuity of this state. First, his defensive plan used terrain and depth as a method to protect his strategic reserve from air or ground attack. He also used the depth of the Soviet interior as a method to weaken Center Group and direct its advance into the preserved strength of the 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon and strategic reserve.

Second, he preserved the strategic reserve as a method to conduct counterattacks and counteroffensives. The Soviet Army consistently surprised German commanders with new forces on the battlefields at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk.<sup>118</sup>

If the German Army defeated the Soviet one as they had the Poles and French, the Soviet State would suffer their same fate. Zhukov achieved Stalin's end state because he developed operational methods for the Soviet military to achieve it.

It is difficult to measure how Zhukov integrated his joint and combined power. Since much of his air force was destroyed in June 1941, the bulk of the campaign was a ground one and the defense was fought exclusively with Soviet forces.

Yet, if one measures how he integrated available forces into a defensive plan and the actual attacks he led, he receives high marks. First, the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe never paralyzed his echeloned defense long enough to cause the defense to collapse. His plan could always engage the German advance in spite of giving up vast amounts of territory and losing many soldiers to a tactically superior fighting one.

His tactical counterattack at Moscow and his operational encirclement at Stalingrad demonstrate his capacity to integrate combat power. Furthermore, at Kursk, as an operational commander, he integrated close air support into a strong point defense that defeated 60 percent of the remaining German armor on the Eastern Front. This joint defense also severely damaged the Luftwaffe's air capability. Ultimately, Zhukov's integration of his joint combat power as the supreme commander of the Soviet counteroffensive attrited the Germany Army in the east.

Zhukov's defensive plan anticipated the requirements for defeating the German attack. First, he understood German strengths and vulnerabilities as the attacker. He equally understood his own. He prioritized his echelons in depth including his strategic reserve in anticipation of those effects. Consequently, by trading space for time with weaker forces, he anticipated the effects of extending the Germans across the Soviet

frontier would have on its advance and at same time preserving the Soviet Army's best forces to confront it.

Second, because he anticipated these effects during the first wargame, he was able to persuade Stalin to mobilize some of his armed forces well before the German attack and most of the strategic reserve before the actual invasion date. Although the results of the second game are not yet uncovered, one can credibly assume from Stalin's decisions to defend in depth and mobilize some his strategic assets, that Zhukov was equally successful in this one.

Consequently, Zhukov was able to begin the early constitution of the strategic reserve. Stalin would later relieve Zhukov. Yet the character of the defense remained and Stalin had the strategic assets with which to fight. As a result, during all critical stages of the defense, the Soviets always had forces available to conduct decisive counterattacks.

Although there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the Soviets were tactically surprised by the German advance through the Soviet State, there is ample evidence to show they were not so operationally. Zhukov recognized that the better trained and equipped German Army could destroy the Soviet one. He made the mental and physical adjustments in his plan as an operational designer to avoid those paralyzing affects.<sup>119</sup>

In conclusion, Zhukov's defensive plan and the Soviet execution of it embody the requirements for operational art. His operationally broad vision provided the design required to defeat the tactically effective German operations in the USSR. Because of this defensive design, the Soviet's were able to link aggressive counterattack methods with their means to achieve their operational and strategic ends. Despite the devastating

defeats suffered in the 1<sup>st</sup> echelon fight, Zhukov's tactical attack at Moscow and his operational ones at Stalingrad and Kursk are examples of his capacity to preserve and integrate combat and joint combat power. Finally, his anticipation of the German attack allowed the Soviet military to avoid paralysis and to consistently surprise the enemy.

Consequently, he and the Soviet military met all of operational art's requirements and achieved Stalin's end state. Furthermore, sound operational planning and execution, in this case, overcame tactical failures. Chapter Four will show that meeting some of the requirements does not have the same result.

## Chapter Four

### All Operational Art Requirements Met

*Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy's balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight.<sup>120</sup>*

*Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations*

From the late 1940s to the early 1990s, the United States was engaged in the Cold War. As the free world's only superpower, the US accepted responsibility for fighting communism on many fronts. This Cold War environment determined how America would and could apply its combat power to achieve a national end. General Douglas MacArthur planned and executed a campaign in Korea during this Cold War period.

After World War II, the US and Soviet Union administered the surrender of Japanese forces with the understanding that these two great powers would reunify Korea in 1947. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was also consolidating its power in the communist bloc and the Chinese were waging a civil war. General MacArthur commanded US forces in East Asia during this period.<sup>121</sup>

In 1948, the government south of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel in Korea held democratic elections, while the communist government in the North did not recognize them. Consequently, the United Nations (UN) declared the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel an internationally recognized boundary between North and South Korea.<sup>122</sup>



Adding to the tension in the region, the Chinese Communists won the nation's Civil War. In July 1949, the Chinese Communist Party established the Republic of China.<sup>123</sup>

Then on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson announced the withdrawal plan of US forces from their World War II security zones. To the dismay of the South Koreans and the delight of the Soviets and the Chinese, he did not include South Korea in the US's new defensive perimeter.<sup>124</sup>

On June 25, the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), with material aid from the Soviet Union and moral support from the Chinese, invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) with ten well equipped divisions. Their force included Soviet World War II artillery, air and a brigade of modern Soviet tanks. The rapid invasion surprised the ROK Army (ROKA) and its US advisors.<sup>125</sup> Despite having war plans to counter a North Korean invasion, they could not react quickly enough with their eight ROKA divisions to the surprise and shock effect the NKPA forces had achieved over them.<sup>126</sup>

In response to the invasion, the UN security council held an emergency session.<sup>127</sup> On June 27, the UN declared that it would authorize the use of force to aid South Korea repel the North Korean invasion and reestablish the international boundary in Korea. President Truman unilaterally endorsed the UN mandate.<sup>128</sup>

Truman and his administration had different motives than the UN. They did not want to tolerate communist expansion anywhere in the world. Consequently, Truman positioned naval assets in the Formosa Strait to deter Chinese involvement in the crisis.<sup>129</sup> Additionally on June 30, 1950, Truman authorized General MacArthur to use US combat troops to enforce the UN mandate. Yet, Truman's use of combat forces in Korea was

more than a UN restoration of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, it was a demonstration to the Soviet Union that the US would not tolerate communist aggression.<sup>130</sup> Consequently, Truman viewed the conflict in Korea as a requirement to contain communism in the Cold War.

At this same time, General MacArthur finished making an on site visit to Korea. He was convinced that the ROKA could not prevent the NKPA from seizing the entire peninsula. He originally thought the North Korea war aims were not that extreme and the ROKA could handle the situation. He no longer held that opinion and began planning for the deployment and use of US joint forces on the peninsula.<sup>131</sup>

On July 5, 1950, the first element of the 8<sup>th</sup> US Army in Japan engaged the North Koreans in South Korea.<sup>132</sup> Soldiers on the ground felt that once the NKPA saw that the US Army was on the scene, they would rapidly retreat back to the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. The soldiers of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army in Korea did not create this effect.<sup>133</sup>

Then on July 7, the UN suggested that nations support the US in its efforts in the ROK. MacArthur became the defacto UN Commander of its forces to restore the territorial integrity of South Korea.<sup>134</sup>

From July 5 to August 30, the 8<sup>th</sup> US Army and the ROKA delayed NKPA units south to Pusan.<sup>135</sup> Despite giving up ground, MacArthur refused to allow these forces to suffer the humiliation of being pushed off the peninsula.<sup>136</sup>

He employed all assets at his disposal to prevent it. American and Australian Air Forces attacked NKPA lines of communication north and south of the parallel. They also provided close air support to the 8<sup>th</sup> Army and ROKA units in direct contact with the NKPA. In addition, the US Navy protected the delaying force's sea flanks. Naval air also interdicted North Korean attempts to use sea and ground lines of communication.<sup>137</sup>

These combined operations had devastating effects on NKPA. As its operations became more extended in the South, their material and reinforcements were increasingly vulnerable to these attacks. This weakening effect would help shape MacArthur's chances for success in Korea.<sup>138</sup>

As early as July 13, MacArthur developed his plan to reestablish the territorial integrity of the ROK. Clay Blair in his book *The Forgotten War* effectively summarized MacArthur's campaign plan.

He would first "isolate the battlefield" by closing off NKPA supply routes at the China and Russia borders with American air power. . . After the battlefield had been isolated and stabilized, MacArthur went on, his intention was not merely to drive the NKPA back across the 38th Parallel but rather to "destroy" it. This he would do by reviving the recently canceled Inchon amphibious landing plan, designed to trap the NKPA in giant pincers between those forces and an attacking Eighth Army. . . After the NKPA had been destroyed, the problem would be to "compose and unite Korea," and that might require American occupation of the entire peninsula."<sup>139</sup>

His operational end state was the destruction of the NKPA, not the restoration of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. However if he destroyed the NKPA south of the parallel, he would accomplish that end, so he centered his operational goal on this force's destruction. Consequently, early in MacArthur's planning estimate, he considered crossing the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel to accomplish his objectives.


His plan had three vital elements. First, an air power element needed to isolate the enemy from its base of supply. Second, a naval element, as it had done in World War II, needed to maneuver a large ground force and surprise the enemy with an amphibious assault at Inchon. Finally, a ground element needed to breakout from Pusan to trap the enemy between the Inchon insertion and the Pusan perimeter.

MacArthur's plan to land at Inchon was actually developed by Pentagon staffers. They conceived it in late June 1950 and called it SL-17. MacArthur requested fifty copies

of the plan for his command's review.<sup>140</sup> The JCS did not endorse SL-17 because they considered it too dangerous.<sup>141</sup> MacArthur loved it for its audacity. He aggressively sought the correct forces from the JCS to execute what he called at the time Operation Bluehearts. He also needed time to rehabilitate his UN command on the ground to conduct the breakout of Pusan.<sup>142</sup>

Inside this newly formed defensive perimeter, MacArthur conducted a build up of material and troops.<sup>143</sup> Five battered ROKA divisions and the 8<sup>th</sup> Army reinforced with a US Marine brigade fought vigorously against fourteen NKPA divisions to maintain Pusan's integrity, so that MacArthur could take advantage of its interior lines.<sup>144</sup> Combined and joint air assets provided close air support to enhance the defense. In addition, much of the remaining ROKA was reconstituted. 8<sup>th</sup> Army also trained and formed Korean Augmentation Units inside the perimeter as future individual replacements to US ones.<sup>145</sup>

On September 11, while MacArthur was putting the finishing refinements on Operation Bluehearts, known to his command as Operation Chromite, Truman met with his National Security Council advisors. Truman decided that UN forces should do nothing to provoke Chinese and Russian forces into the conflict. He did permit the destruction of the North Korean Army if UN forces did not enter Manchuria or the USSR.<sup>146</sup> Truman's strategic end state at this time did not affect MacArthur's operational one. The President, in effect, supported MacArthur's vision to destroy the NKPA north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel if required.



**Figure 3: Korean War 1950**

From September 13 to 15, naval forces bombarded the beaches at Incheon in preparation for Operation Chromite's amphibious landing (Figure 3).<sup>147</sup> Then in the early morning of September 15, 1950, MacArthur landed forces at Incheon.<sup>148</sup> In spite of the complex tides and the rocky beaches, the 1<sup>st</sup> US Marine Division followed by the 7<sup>th</sup> US Infantry Division landed and within two days had surrounded Seoul.<sup>149</sup>

In support of this invasion, MacArthur's 8<sup>th</sup> Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter on September 18.<sup>150</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> US Cavalry Division led the operation. The NKPA commander realized his predicament and began to withdraw north. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry's advance was so rapid that it was able to link-up with the 7<sup>th</sup> Division and Seoul was liberated on September 26.<sup>151</sup>

The surprise of this landing combined with the breakout paralyzed North Korean operations in the south. By October 1, North Korean forces could no longer conduct effective military operations in the South and it fled across the parallel. UN and ROK forces reestablished the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.<sup>152</sup> But Operation Chromite failed to destroy the NKPA. MacArthur allowed the ROKA to cross the parallel to pursue the NKPA. The ROKA headed for the North's capital, Pyongyang.<sup>153</sup>

On October 7, the UN mandated that its forces could cross the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel to reunify Korea.<sup>154</sup> Under the pretense of this mandate combined with MacArthur's dramatic success at Inchon, the Truman administration and the JCS viewed an invasion of the North as another opportunity to deter future communist aggression. Yet, there was an underlying fear that another dramatic MacArthur success could spin out of control into World War.<sup>155</sup>

These underlying fears were justified in spite of the overt signals Truman was receiving from the Soviets.<sup>156</sup> The Chinese had been preparing to assist the North Koreans since June 1950. They actually began inserting major forces into Korea across the Yalu on October 15.<sup>157</sup>

Simultaneously, Truman and General Bradley, the current Chairman of the JCS, concerned about the conflict expanding into one with Chinese and Soviet forces, met with MacArthur at Wake Island to discuss their options on the peninsula. At Wake, Truman and Bradley warned MacArthur of the danger Chinese involvement in Korea would have on his operation.<sup>158</sup> MacArthur told them he would achieve victory over the North Koreans, and Chinese and Soviet involvement did not concern him.

He privately told Truman that the Chinese Civil War had weakened their military capability to the extent they would not risk war with his command.<sup>159</sup> Furthermore, if they did invade with forces from Manchuria, (as they were on this date) he would destroy them from the air as they attempted to invade. He went on to tell Truman that although the Soviets did pose a credible threat, mounting such an effort was well beyond their current military capability in the region. Truman and Bradley did not privately or publicly challenge the General's assertions.<sup>160</sup>

From October 19 to 24, UN airborne and ground forces captured Pyongyang. ROKA forces continued attacks against the NKPA and reached the Yalu (Figure 3, p. 41). The X<sup>th</sup> US Army Corps, later reinforced with two US Marine divisions and a ROKA corps, although not in contact with the NKPA pursued them up the eastern side of the peninsula to the Yalu.<sup>161</sup> The Chinese Army, moving only at night, continued to insert forces out of contact with the ROKA and UN.<sup>162</sup>

On October 25, the Chinese invaded Korea in support of the NKPA.<sup>163</sup> Their major invasion surprised MacArthur's command to such an extent that he refused to believe that it could be one. Although the UN and ROKA would fight vigorous battles against the Chinese near the Yalu, by November, the Chinese invasion forced its retreat.<sup>164</sup>

The Chinese invasion altered MacArthur's operational end state. He declared that although this was an entirely new war, victory was still at hand. Despite becoming bitter that limiting operations to south of the Yalu had caused this surprise, he felt he could repeat what he had done to the NKPA on the Chinese. Consequently, his new operational end state was the destruction of Chinese forces in Korea and possibly Manchuria.<sup>165</sup>

On January 13, 1951, Truman sent guidance to MacArthur. He told the General to use his means to contain the conflict in Korea and not to allow it to expand into China.<sup>166</sup>

Yet on March 25, distressed by Truman's continued handicap on his methods, MacArthur publicly threatened to attack China with air power to reduce its capabilities in Korea.<sup>167</sup> Angered by this insubordination, Truman relieved MacArthur on April 11 for interfering with his policies to contain the war in Korea and his negotiations to settle the conflict.<sup>168</sup>

These are the results of MacArthur's campaign from 1950 to 1951. First, the General accomplished the initial UN mandate. Second, he did not contain the conflict to the original forces in the theater. Because of the Chinese invasion, the Korean War was stalemated along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel from January 1951 to July 26, 1953. The UN command and Chinese and North Korean forces signed a truce agreement on July 27, 1953.<sup>169</sup>

Let us now analyze General MacArthur's ability to meet all of operational art's requirements

MacArthur designed an operational plan to destroy the NKPA. His landing at Inchon and breakout of Pusan destroyed the NKPA's capability to occupy the south, but did not destroy this force. Although he had reestablished the territorial integrity of South Korea, he along with Truman, excited by his success, was allowed to cross the parallel in pursuit of destruction of the NKPA.

His pursuit of the NKPA north of the parallel captured the capital city of Pyongyang and rendered North Korean forces essentially combat ineffective. For a brief period, MacArthur had accomplished his initial operational end. But the insertion a credible Chinese force into Korea created a new operational requirement for MacArthur. One he would not be authorized to execute.

Consequently, MacArthur's military vision to accomplish his initial operational end was effective. We will never know if his vision for the second one would have had the same result. Yet, one must argue that his impressions of Chinese involvement clouded his vision before and after they invaded.



Once the Chinese invaded, MacArthur did not use his means to accomplish his new operational goal in a manner consistent with Truman's desired strategic end state. Prior to this event, he demonstrated an enormous capacity to do so.

Despite having ground forces that were not well trained or equipped, MacArthur effectively used his joint and combined methods from the sea and air to accomplish his operational end. He used these methods to attrit the NKPA in the South, to protect his build-up of forces in Pusan, and to execute Operation Chromite.

Once MacArthur wanted to use these same methods to accomplish his new operational end, Truman relieved MacArthur. His operational methods were no longer consistent with Truman's strategic concerns. His desire to expand the conflict into China with his air forces had put his methods in direct conflict with the President's strategic goals.

MacArthur, until his public pronouncement, integrated all of his available combat power. He effectively used UN air, naval, ground and ROKA combat power to restore the territorial integrity of South Korea and destroy the NKPA.

The landing at Inchon and breakout of Pusan integrated all of his ground, sea, and air operations to overwhelm the NKPA in less than two weeks. His operations in North Korea captured its capital, and until the Chinese became involved in the conflict, reunified the Korean peninsula. MacArthur also integrated UN and ROKA forces in the combined defense of Pusan, the landing at Inchon, the breakout at Pusan, and the attack across the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.

Once the Chinese invaded, MacArthur was not authorized to maximize the effects of his ability to integrate his forces. Yet, until his reaction to the Chinese invasion, MacArthur proved his ability to integrate joint and combined operations.

This leads to MacArthur's inability to anticipate the impact of his operations north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. The Chinese were prepared to support the North Koreans if their help was required. Not only did the Chinese invasion surprise him, but MacArthur refused to believe the impact of it and had to withdraw to the south in response.

He had failed to effectively wargame the Chinese response to his actions in North Korea. The Chinese surprised him because they covertly prepared for the invasion in advance, moved at night, and stayed out of major contact with ROKA and UN forces until they attacked. Because he considered them militarily weak, he did not make the mental and physical adjustments to his operations north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel to account for their potential involvement.

Consequently, the Chinese dominated his command for five months. He lost the opportunity to reunify Korea by not limiting his actions in North Korea and not planning to thwart the invasion.<sup>170</sup>

After November 1950, his failure to anticipate the effects of Chinese involvement and his proposed means to counter it produced an ineffective thought process that interfered with Truman's strategic end state. Consequently, the President relieved him. By meeting only some of operational art's requirements, he did not create Truman's end state. Although the opposing forces ended up essentially where the conflict began, the opportunity to reunify Korea was lost and tension exists today.

Consequently, a commander can have adequate vision at the start of a campaign, but fail to adapt it and not achieve the national end state. Too, a commander's brilliance at employing joint and combined forces must be matched by his ability to anticipate how the enemy will react to that brilliance. This case study shows that a commander's military abilities must coincide with his authority's political realities. Truman's Cold War realities constrained MacArthur's idea of how to wage the war in Korea.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Conclusion**

The essential question answered in this monograph is "How does meeting operational art's requirements affect a theater commander's ability to accomplish the national end state in the Age of Industrialized Warfare?" It has focused on the ability of various commanders to meet operational art's requirements. They are broad vision, relating means to ends, effective joint and combined cooperation, and anticipation.

The current state of modern warfare requires that commanders apply operational art to impose their nation's will on another. These requirements are so profound that they will have fruitful or disastrous impact on the national end state.

The commanders in the case studies examined caused or did not achieve their political leadership's end state. This statement does not presuppose that these are the only requirements to achieve a national goal. Certainly the integration of the other forms of national power: diplomatic, information, and economic, tie operational campaigns to a strategic end state. However, in operational art, a commander's inability to meet all of these requirements will almost surely cause a campaign's failure.

In Chapter Two, General Hamilton's operational failures caused his inability to achieve his operational end, freedom of sea movement in the Dardanelles. His vision was too narrowly focused on destroying the fortifications on Gallipoli. He also failed to

anticipate the Turkish mobile defense and exploit his own successes. Furthermore, Hamilton did not develop methods to take advantage of his naval superiority and his experiences on the peninsula. Finally, the British military did not develop a unified combat team to capture the straits and seize Constantinople. Consequently, despite having a clear strategic end state, Hamilton failed to properly apply operational art to achieve it.

In Chapter Three, Zhukov and the Soviet military met all of the requirements for operational art. Zhukov's vision to defeat the German advance at Moscow created a defensive design that absorbed the German attack, defeated its offensive operations at Moscow, and then attrited the German Army in Russia. He anticipated the mental and physical adjustments required to turn the enemy's strengths into weaknesses and his weaknesses into strengths. Stalin's end state was to halt the offensive and preserve the force. Zhukov related operational methods to his means to accomplish those ends. Zhukov also integrated his available combat power in the defense to overcome many defeats and material losses to remain an effective defensive force. Furthermore, he demonstrated his personal command of them at Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk.

In Chapter Four, much of the failure in Korea can be placed on MacArthur's inability to adjust to his new operational end state. Although he did design events to defeat the NKPA, he failed to wargame the Chinese response to his victory. His desire to expand the conflict into China put methods in direct conflict with Truman's end state. Until November 1950, he proved his ability to integrate joint and combined operations to achieve his initial operational end state. Yet, this ability conflicted with his political leader's desires to contain the conflict.

Figure 4 compares operational art's requirements met versus the achieved end state.

	Broad Vision	Joint and Combined Operations	Ends to Means	Anticipation	End State
Hamilton British Navy War Council	No	No	No	No	No
Zhukov Stalin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MacArthur Truman	Yes	Yes	No	No	No.

**Figure 4: Requirements versus End State**

Operational art's requirements establish the foundation for conducting modern warfare because they create an integrative thought process between operations in a theater and the accomplishment of a national end state. When a commander does not meet all of these requirements in a well thought out way, he will probably fail to achieve his operational end state. He will most likely create meaningless events on the battlefield, that lead to strategic failure. A commander cannot bat .250, .500, or even .750 and expect to achieve the national end state. He must hit 1.000.

What is the impact of this analysis?

First, each of these commanders had clear national end states. It is popular in the current military to question the strategic level's capability to form an adequate end state before launching military operations; we claim that is all we need. This research indicates that given a clear strategic goal, the potential exists to execute ineffective operational art and not achieve that goal.

Finally, FM 100-5 and JP 3-0 have identified the requirements for creating effective operational art to attain the strategic objective. Yet, in this author's opinion, they do not give them exact explanation. These requirements should be well defined terms in doctrine. The writers of the next version of these documents should better define these requirements to insure commanders understand their meaning and the power of their intended effects in a campaign.

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<sup>1</sup> I summarized this discussion of Gen. Powell's view on the change of strategy in the Gulf from Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) p. 284-92.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce Menning, "An Operator/Planner's Introduction to Operational Art," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1995) p. 333.

<sup>3</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael and Howard, Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 261.

<sup>4</sup> I summarized the importance of decisive battle from Clausewitz, *On War*. p. 260.

<sup>5</sup> I summarized the importance of decisive battle to commander's of this era from Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz," in *On War*, ed. Michael and Howard, Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.39.

<sup>6</sup> I summarized the importance of decisive battle to commander's of this era from Menning, "An Operator/Planner's Introduction to Operational Art," p. 334.

<sup>7</sup> I summarized the rise of firepower and dispersion in this new era from Menning, "An Operator/Planner's Introduction to Operational Art," p. 334.

<sup>8</sup> I summarized the rise of communication in this new era from Menning, "An Operator/Planner's Introduction to Operational Art," p. 334.

<sup>9</sup> I summarized the rise of national endurance in this new era from Menning, "An Operator/Planner's Introduction to Operational Art," p. 334.

<sup>10</sup> I summarized the Svechin's concern with modern warfare from Jacob W. Kipp, "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory," in *Strategy*, ed. Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publications, 1992), p. 25.

<sup>11</sup> I summarized the Svechin's idea of unifying the purpose of battles from Kipp, "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory," p. 24.

<sup>12</sup> I summarized the Svechin's concern with Russian battle in the Russo-Japanese War from Kipp, "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory," p. 26-7.

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<sup>13</sup> I summarized the Svechin's idea of the decline of decisive battles from Menning, "An Operator/Planner's Introduction to Operational Art," p. 334.

<sup>14</sup> Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View, 1992), p. 69.

<sup>15</sup> I summarized the Svechin's new questions for the theater commander from Menning, "An Operator/Planner's Introduction to Operational Art," p. 336.

<sup>16</sup> I summarized the Svechin's new questions for the theater commander from Kipp, "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory," p. 26-7.

<sup>17</sup> I paraphrased Svechin's responsibility of the political leadership from Svechin, *Strategy*. p. 91.

<sup>18</sup> I summarized the Svechin's idea of the new layers of warfare from Kipp, "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory," p. 38.

<sup>19</sup> I paraphrased Svechin's idea of operational art from Svechin, *Strategy*, p. 68-69

<sup>20</sup> Kipp, "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory," p. 55.

<sup>21</sup> Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, 1993), 6-2. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), p. II-2.

<sup>22</sup> I paraphrased this pub's doctrinal approach to the NCA from Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. p. I-7.

<sup>23</sup> Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, p. 6-2. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. p. II-3.

<sup>24</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. p. II-3.

<sup>25</sup> I paraphrased this pub's doctrinal relationship between means to ends from Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. p. II-3.

<sup>26</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. p. III 9-10.

<sup>27</sup> Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, p. Glossary-0.

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<sup>28</sup> I paraphrased this pub's doctrinal approach to anticipation from Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. p. III 12.

<sup>29</sup> Field Manual 100-5, Operations, p. 6-3; Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. p. III 2-3.

<sup>30</sup> Colin Powell, "A Joint Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts" (Washington, D. C.: Office of Joints Chiefs of Staff, 1992), p. 22.

<sup>31</sup> Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 264.

<sup>32</sup> This discussion of the War Council's strategic end state and use of force I summarized from Alan Moorehead, *Gallipoli* (New York: New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1982), 48-49; J. F. Fuller, C., *A Military History of the Western World* (New York, New York: De Capo Press, 1992), p. 236.

<sup>33</sup> This discussion of the first naval attack I summarized from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 239.

<sup>34</sup> This discussion of the Council's reaction to the first naval attack I summarized from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 238.

<sup>35</sup> This discussion of the second naval attack I paraphrased from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 80.

<sup>36</sup> This discussion German and Turk reaction to the second naval attack I paraphrased form Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 241.

<sup>37</sup> I paraphrased Sanders' new force structure from Eliot A. Cohen, and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 137.

<sup>38</sup> I summarized Sanders' active defense strategy from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 104-5. Although the author does not use the term active defense, I have applied his description to this modern definition.

<sup>39</sup> I paraphrased Hamilton's appointment from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 82.

<sup>40</sup> I paraphrased Hamilton's mission orders from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 82.

<sup>41</sup> I summarized Hamilton's force structure and deployment problems from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 239.

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- <sup>42</sup> I summarized Hamilton's force structure and deployment problems from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 239.
- <sup>43</sup> I summarized Hamilton's gathering of his command and staff on the Queen Elizabeth from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 240.
- <sup>44</sup> This description of Bulair I obtained from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 240-1.
- <sup>45</sup> This description of Hamilton's plan to attack Gallipoli I obtained from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 120-1 I obtained information on the deception plan at Bulair and Kum Kale from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 137.
- <sup>46</sup> This evaluation of Hamilton's plan I paraphrased from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 137.
- <sup>47</sup> Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, see map and photograph insert beginning on p. 119.
- <sup>48</sup> This description of Sanders' view of the events as they happened I summarized from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 130-1
- <sup>49</sup> This description of events at Anzac from the British and Turkish perspectives I put together from these two sources Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 243 and Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 150-2; 134-41.
- <sup>50</sup> This casualty figure at Anzac Cove I found in Ernest and Trevor Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, (London: England: Janes Publishing Company), p. 954.
- <sup>51</sup> This description of events at Cape Helles I summarized from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 141.
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- <sup>54</sup> This description of events at Cape Helles I summarized from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 242.
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<sup>56</sup> This description of how Hamilton's day ended I summarized from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 138.

<sup>57</sup> This evaluation of Hamilton's future approach to the campaign I summarized from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 219.

<sup>58</sup> The excitement the landings created in England I summarized from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 238-9.

<sup>59</sup> I summarized this force disposition from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 246-7. The author explains where the other two divisions are located on p. 104-5.

<sup>60</sup> This description of the men and material available to Sanders I paraphrased from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 150.

<sup>61</sup> This description of the men and material available to Hamilton I paraphrased from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 246-7.

<sup>62</sup> This description of the field artillery effects I paraphrased from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 150.

<sup>63</sup> This description of naval artillery effects and use of I paraphrased from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 152.

<sup>64</sup> This description of the Stopford's intel and mission I paraphrased from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 260.

<sup>65</sup> Sanders' reaction to the attack at Suvla Bay I obtained from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 264-270.

<sup>66</sup> Sanders' use of terrain and Turk forces I paraphrased from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 144-3.

<sup>67</sup> This evaluation of Hamilton's reaction to events and their outcome I summarized from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 264-66.

<sup>68</sup> This evaluation of Hamilton's reaction to events and their outcome I summarized from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 144-6.

<sup>69</sup> I obtained this date of Hamilton's relief from Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 260.

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<sup>70</sup> I paraphrased Munro's assessment and the day the evacuation began from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 100, 117.

<sup>71</sup> Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 138-9.

<sup>72</sup> I summarized Sanders' concept of reorganizing the Turk defense from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 316. As previously explained the author did not use the term active defense.

<sup>73</sup> Hamilton's focus on gaining the fortifications on Gallipoli I summarized from Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, p. 246-7.

<sup>74</sup> Svechin, *Strategy*, p. 91.

<sup>75</sup> I summarized this description of the Nazi-Soviet pact from Louis L. Snyder, "World War II," *The Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia*, retrieved electronically from Microsoft's Internet Explorer on 23 Apr 1996, p. 5.

<sup>76</sup> I summarized this description of Directive 21 from Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945*, p. 256-7.

<sup>77</sup> I summarized this description of the Stalin's problems with Soviet intel from Jacob Kipp, "Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations" *The Soviet and Post Soviet Review*, 1992, p. 96

<sup>78</sup> I summarized this description of the Stalin's wargame from Bryan I. Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1984), 29, 37-38.

<sup>79</sup> I summarized this description of Stalin's wargame from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 37-39.

<sup>80</sup> I summarized this description of Stalin's wargame from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 40-41.

<sup>81</sup> I summarized this description of Stalin's wargame from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 56, 58-59.

<sup>82</sup> This description of what the Soviet main effort in the defense I compared and contrasted from Kipp, "Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations" p. 105; and Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 51-2.

<sup>83</sup> This description of Zhukov's defense I summarized from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 35.

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<sup>84</sup> This description of Zhukov's defense I summarized from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 41.

<sup>85</sup> This description of Zhukov's defense I summarized from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 100.

<sup>86</sup> This description of Zhukov's defense I summarized from Kipp, "Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations" p. 105.

<sup>87</sup> This description of Zhukov's defense I summarized from Kipp, "Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations" p. 95.

<sup>88</sup> This description of Zhukov's defense I summarized from Kipp, "Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations" p. 105.

<sup>89</sup> This description of Zhukov's defense I summarized from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 42, 49, 54-55.

<sup>90</sup> I obtained this date Stalin mobilized part of his strategic reserve from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 47.

<sup>91</sup> This description of Zhukov's defense I summarized from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 56.

<sup>92</sup> I summarized this description of the Operation Barbarossa from Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories*, trans. Anthony G. Powell (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 178.

<sup>93</sup> I summarized this description of the Operation Barbarossa in July from Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, p. 373.

<sup>94</sup> I summarized this description of the Operation Barbarossa in July from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1079.

<sup>95</sup> I obtained this information on Zhukov's relief and replacement from Kipp, "Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations" p. 134.

<sup>96</sup> I summarized this description of the Operation Barbarossa from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 315

<sup>97</sup> I summarized this description of the Operation Barbarossa from Snyder, *World War II*, p. 15.



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<sup>98</sup> I summarized this description of the Operation Barbarossa from Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945*, p. 332-335.

<sup>99</sup> I summarized this description of the effects of weather and the Soviets on the Germans Operation Barbarossa from Kipp, "Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations" p. 134.

<sup>100</sup> I summarized this description of the Southern Group dividing into A and B from Manstein, *Lost Victories*, p. 209-217; and on its missions from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1089.

<sup>101</sup> I summarized Zhukov's command of this front from Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945*, p. 426-440.

<sup>102</sup> I summarized Zhukov's command of this front from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1089.

<sup>103</sup> I summarized the German defeat at Stalingrad from Manstein, *Lost Victories*, p. 364.

<sup>104</sup> I summarized the German breakout and reconstitution after Stalingrad from Manstein, *Lost Victories*, p. 438-9.

<sup>105</sup> I summarized the Zhukov's defense after Stalingrad from Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945*, p. 439.

<sup>106</sup> I summarized the German plans for Citadel from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1009.

<sup>107</sup> I summarized the German plans for Citadel from John Walker and Samuel Alexander, *A856 Theater Air: Modern Case Studies in Military Campaign Planning and Execution* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1994), Operation Citadel, p. 2-3.

<sup>108</sup> I summarized the German delay at Citadel from Manstein, *Lost Victories*, p. 448-49

<sup>109</sup> I summarized the Zhukov's plans for Citadel from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1115.

<sup>110</sup> I summarized the Zhukov's results for Citadel from Walker and Alexander, *A856 Theater Air: Modern Case Studies in Military Campaign Planning and Execution*, p. Operation Citadel, p. 24.

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- <sup>111</sup> I summarized the Zhukov's results for Citadel from Walker and Alexander, *A856 Theater Air: Modern Case Studies in Military Campaign Planning and Execution*, p. Operation Citadel, p. 24.
- <sup>112</sup> I summarized the Zhukov's results for Citadel from Manstein, *Lost Victories*, p. 443-49.
- <sup>113</sup> I summarized the Zhukov's command of the 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon after Citadel into the next year from Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945*, p. 475.
- <sup>114</sup> I summarized the German strength after Citadel from Manstein, *Lost Victories*, p. 280-1.
- <sup>115</sup> I obtained this fact that Zhukov commanded all Soviet Forces for the counteroffensive from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1115
- <sup>116</sup> These Soviet results after their counteroffensive I obtained from Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, p. 377.
- <sup>117</sup> Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 34.
- <sup>118</sup> I put together the surprises commanders consistently experienced with Soviet manpower from Cooper, *The German Army 1933-1945*, p. 299; and Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 59.
- <sup>119</sup> I summarized this notion of Zhukov's anticipation of German strategy and effects from Fugate, *Operation Barbarossa*, p. 315.
- <sup>120</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, p. III-3.
- <sup>121</sup> I summarized this sythesis of post World War II from Roy K. Flint, "The Korean War," *The Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia*, retrieved electronically from Microsoft's Internet Explorer on 20 Apr 1996, p. 1.
- <sup>122</sup> I summarized pre war Korea from Roy E. Appleman, *The US Army in the Korean War* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1986), p: 4-5.
- <sup>123</sup> I obtained this date of the Chinese Civil War and aftermath from Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 676.
- <sup>124</sup> I obtained the impact of Acheson's remarks on the Soviets and the Chinese from T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press), p. 52-53.

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- <sup>125</sup> I summarized the initial events and troops strengths at the war's outset from Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, p. 12-13.
- <sup>126</sup> I summarized the initial events and troops strengths at the war's outset from Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War*, (London, England: Doubleday, 1987}, p. 59-61.
- <sup>127</sup> I summarized the initial political impact at the war's outset in the UN and Truman administration from Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, p. 78.
- <sup>128</sup> I summarized the initial political impact at the war's outset in the UN and Truman administration from Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, p. 80-87.
- <sup>129</sup> I summarized the initial the Truman administration's positioning of the US 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet in the Formosa Strait from Flint, "The Korean War," p. 2.
- <sup>130</sup> I obtained this description of the Truman administrations approach to the war and the UN from Appleman, *The US Army in the Korean War*, p. 46; and its true motives toward containment from Blair, *The Forgotten War*, p. 86.
- <sup>131</sup> MacArthur's trip to Korea and his opinion afterward I summarized from Blair, *The Forgotten War*, p. 81.
- <sup>132</sup> I obtained this date of American troop involvement in Korea from Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, p. 98.
- <sup>133</sup> The US troop beliefs and the actual NK reaction to them I summarized from Blair, *The Forgotten War*, p. 102-3.
- <sup>134</sup> I obtained the date of this UN resolution from Flint, "The Korean War," p. 2.
- <sup>135</sup> I obtained this date range on the UN and ROKA delay to Pusan from Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, p. 147-56.
- <sup>136</sup> MacArthur's idea of sparing the US embarrassment of being pushed off the peninsula I summarized from D. Clayton Jones, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985) p. 430.
- <sup>137</sup> This description of MacArthur's use of joint and combined power I paraphrased from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1242.
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<sup>140</sup> This history of SL-17 I obtained from Blair, *The Forgotten War*, p. 87.

<sup>141</sup> The JCS's evaluation of SL-17 I summarized Jones, *The MacArthur Years*, p. 466.

<sup>142</sup> MacArthur's opinion of, arguments for the right mix of troops, the time he needed at Pusan I obtained from Blair, *The Forgotten War*, p. 119-120.

<sup>143</sup> MacArthur's build up at Pusan I summarized from Appleman, *The US Army in the Korean War*, p. 386-90.

<sup>144</sup> I paraphrased this description of events in and outside the Pusan perimeter from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1242.

<sup>145</sup> 8<sup>th</sup> US Army's training of Korean replacements inside the perimeter I summarized from Appleman, *The US Army in the Korean War*, p. 386-90.

<sup>146</sup> I obtained this summary of Truman's NSC meeting from Flint, "The Korean War," p. 3.

<sup>147</sup> The dates of Operation Chromite's naval bombardment I obtained from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1242; and the map from Cohen, *Military Misfortunes*, p. 167.

<sup>148</sup> The dates of Operation Chromite's landing at Inchon I obtained from Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, p. 661.

<sup>149</sup> I paraphrased this description of the Inchon landing from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1243.

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<sup>151</sup> I paraphrased this description of the breakout from Pusan from Depuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 1242.

<sup>152</sup> I summarized the reestablishment of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel from Appleman, *The US Army in the Korean War*, p. 600-6.

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- <sup>159</sup> MacArthur's attitude toward the Chinese I summarized from Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, p. 277.
- <sup>160</sup> MacArthur's private discussion with Truman I summarized from Blair, *The Forgotten War*, p. 348-9.
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